Maritain on Beauty
By Pr. Prof. Dr. Mauro Grosso
Pr. Prof. Dr. Mauro Grosso is a Catholic priest at the Archdiocese of Turin (Italy). He holds a degree in philosophy from the University of Turin and a Ph.D. from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. He is a tenured full professor of Philosophy at the Theological Faculty of Northern Italy. His research interests include theoretical philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophical theology, and their implications in the digital age.
Maritain on Beauty
What is “beauty” and what does it mean for something to be called “beautiful” according to Jacques Maritain? To answer this question, one must examine Maritain’s reflections on the topic, which he developed over more than thirty years across his works. It is important to remember that Maritain’s approach is foremost an epistemological and metaphysical reflection — rather than merely aesthetic or sociological. To really understand Maritain’s thought, one must consider its deep roots in the philosophy of his guiding teacher: Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Pulchrum as that which pleases when seen
From the very first edition of Art and Scholasticism in 1920, Maritain writes that Saint Thomas “defined the beautiful as that which pleases upon being seen, id quod visum placet.” [1] In a footnote, he refers to the Summa Theologica, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.[2] He does not change this statement or its reference in any of the later editions—neither in 1927, nor in 1935, and not even in 1965.
First of all, it should be noted that the French philosopher does not place the definition id quod visum placet in quotation marks, which suggests that he paraphrases rather than quotes literally. This is a method Maritain uses often throughout his texts, when he refers to the sources he is commenting upon.[3] Such a choice certainly does not help to distinguish between literal quotations and the paraphrases he provides. However, beyond the methodological objections that could be raised, there is a more substantial point worth making here. Saint Thomas’s pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent ("things are called beautiful which, when seen, please") seems to express a sociological observation, whereas Maritain’s definition of beautiful as that which pleases upon being seen (id quod visum placet) appears more like a metaphysical definition.[4] The so-called “sociological” element consists in the common cultural opinion regarding what is beautiful (pulchrum), but it does not approach beauty from an essentialistic approach.[5]
Three decades after Art and Scholasticism, Maritain writes in Creative Intuition that id quod visum placet is a “definition that encompasses the essential aspect of beauty.”[6] Maritain already specified in Art and Scholasticism and states: “Saint Thomas, moreover, does not intend to offer anything more than a definition based upon effect. It is when he establishes the three elements of the Beautiful that he provides an essential definition.”[7]
Maritain uses an “essential approach” to explain that this definition contains the absolute theoretical minimum necessary to understand beauty. But he does more. He also refers to a definition that includes the metaphysical essence of the pulchrum, whose essential components are the three classical elements: (1) integritas (wholeness), (2) proportio (proportion), and (3) claritas (radiance or intelligible brightness).[8]
As others have noted, quod visum placet “does not define beauty in itself, but rather its effect.” Hence Saint Thomas moves from effect to essence: “Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit: quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis” — “Therefore, the beautiful consists in due proportion, because the senses take delight in things that are properly proportioned.”[9]
The nature of beauty is identified with its intrinsic characteristics. Therefore it can be grasped through the nature of aesthetic contemplation, which for Aquinas arises from those three elements. Furthermore, considering other uses of the verb dicuntur by Saint Thomas, it is not correct to interpret this just as an impersonal “it is said,” as if it were only reflecting to a cultural consensus. The third person passive indicative form of dico (dicuntur) can better be understood in a strictly passive sense: “things that please the eye are called beautiful.”[10]
That being said, it should also be noted that Maritain’s formula “id quod visum placet” is not a synthesis of Thomistic doctrine in the manner of a compendium, as if it would replace the two definitions of beauty provided by Saint Thomas in the Summa.
As can be seen both in Art and Scholasticism[11] and in Creative Intuition[12], Maritain refers to both definitions. Indeed, they approach the concept of pulchrum from two distinct perspectives: The definition pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent is objective, insofar as it locates the cause of the pleasure revealed by beautiful things in the things themselves: in the realm of the visible. According to this formulation, “things are beautiful when they give pleasure,”[13] and beauty is thereby confined to the realm of the visible.
Conversely, pulchrum dicitur id cuius apprehensio placet is subjective, in the sense that the source of the pleasure revealed by beautiful things lies within the subject apprehending them. It is in the act of apprehension itself that beauty manifests itself, “when the actual act of perceiving them gives rise to pleasure.”[14]
In this way beauty is attributed a broader scope, extending beyond the visible realm. The two standpoints from which pulchrum has just been examined together create the definitional framework of beauty: it is a property of the object, yet one that cannot exist independently of a subject who derives pleasure from it. For this reason, the two definitions offered by Saint Thomas may be regarded as complementary. Thus, ‘’we may assert that beauty is relative, though not subjective: beauty cannot exist without a subject who takes delight in it, but neither can it exist without an object capable of eliciting such delight’’.[15]
Indeed, Maritain’s assertion can plausibly be interpreted in this light—namely, that the definition pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent is “a definition according to effect.”[16] It is in the complementarity of the two definitions that one may discern the effects of beauty, rather than its essence. This interpretation is not contradicted by Maritain even later in Creative Intuition, where he writes that the id quod visum placet “embraces the essential aspect of beauty,”[17], which “consists in intuitive knowledge and delight. Beauty brings us joy in the very act of knowing—a joy that overflows from the thing to which this act attains.”[18] Thus, id quod visum placet proves to be a definition that seeks to grasp the essential features of pulchrum as it manifest itself in its effects, though not in the sense of its metaphysical essence.
Pulchrum as a transcendental correlate of poetry"
Maritain’s reflection does not conclude with the definition of pulchrum discussed thus far. Following Art and Scholasticism, his thought is further developed in the new contributions found in Creative Intuition. In this later work, Maritain arrives at an additional definition, which may be understood as essential, insofar as it identifies the constitutive characteristics of pulchrum. For this reason, it stands in a complementary relationship to the Thomistic definition—articulated thirty years earlier in Art and Scholasticism—which conceives of beauty in terms of integritas, proportio, and claritas.
The context of the definition proposed by Maritain in Creative Intuition is the relationship between poetry and beauty. In this text, the term pulchrum is no longer employed. Instead, Maritain speaks explicitly of beauty. However, the two expressions are equivalent in meaning within this framework. Maritain writes that beauty is “the transcendental correlate of poetry. […] It is like its native climate and the air it naturally breathes. […] Beauty is the necessary correlate and the end beyond all ends of poetry.”[19]
First of all, to clarify what he means by “correlative,” Maritain explains: “Here too I do not feel entirely at ease with the vocabulary. Poetry is not subordinate to beauty: I would therefore prefer to say that poetry stands in a relationship of co-equality or connaturality with beauty.”[20] Beauty and poetry exist in a reciprocal and equal relationship, which the author calls “correlative,” rendering them “co-equal” and “connatural”[21] to one another. This cannot be fully understood without reference to the other—and this holds true in both directions.
It is necessary to understand what Maritain means by “poetry.” The essential formulation of his thought on this matter is found in his mature aesthetic work, Creative Intuition, which crowns a decades-long speculative journey and articulates this conception at several points throughout the volume. It may be summarized as follows: poetry is the artist’s capacity to perceive, within his own interiority, the reciprocal resonance between the things of the world and his own subjectivity, expressing through the work of art the hidden mysteries of being thus unveiled.[22]
Therefore, poetry is not limited to the production of literary works written in verse, but is rather a general disposition: “a singular relationship of deep harmony between the soul of the artist and (so to speak) the soul of things.”[23] To paraphrase what has just been stated: this general disposition cannot be realized apart from beauty, And beauty, in its turn finds no expression apart from this disposition. What does Maritain mean when he states that beauty is “the end beyond all ends of poetry”? The question appears complex, and the author himself acknowledges the difficulty in answering it.[24] It is necessary to weigh each individual assertion carefully and attempt an analytical understanding of the text, which reads in its entirety as follows:
“Poetry tends toward beauty not as toward an object to be known or created. Neither toward a determined end to be achieved in knowledge or realized in existence. But rather toward that life—precisely your life—that is found in the one whom love has transformed into another self. This is the end beyond all ends of which I have spoken. To reduce it to a determinate end, susceptible to being directly attained, would be to distort the relationship I have sought to illuminate, and in doing so, would betray both poetry and beauty. For beauty can only be reached in a mirror; it eludes our grasp, and poetry is not directed toward any defined purpose. Poetic intuition is not ordered toward beauty as an end or specific object; it only aims to manifest together the poet’s interiority and that which resonates within it—and if poetic intuition is truly expressed, it will inevitably be expressed in beauty, even without conscious intent, since every genuine expression of poetic intuition derives from beauty its integrity, consonance, and radiance.”[25]
Poetry as the singular relationship of profound harmony between the soul of the artist and the soul of things is directed toward beauty, namely pulchrum, not as something to be known or produced, but insofar as it is its gratuitous and disinterested end. In metaphysical terms, it can be said that beauty acts as the final cause with respect to poetry, understood as the artist’s general disposition. Specifically, in this sense, pulchrum is the “life [...] found in the one whom love has transformed into another self.” This statement is obscure. It is necessary to clarify: what this “life” is; what kind of love is meant; who the subject of this love is; and who its object is.
The interpretation is not straightforward and must be sought within Maritain’s own thought. He writes that beauty is like the native climate and the air that poetry naturally breathes, “indeed, it represents what life and existence are to a runner running toward the goal.”[26] If the life that nourishes the poet’s work is the richness of meaning he discovers in the inner being of things—the soul of things—then this is precisely the beauty that acts as the final cause of poetry.
The artist loves this “life of meaning” because it is the source of his creativity, which arises from the Self. The “other self” produced by this creative impulse and the resulting artistic realizations is both the artist, since the creative act of things resonating within his Self transforms his inner being, and the receiver of the artwork, who, by apprehending the artwork, in some sense receives within himself both the artist and the world of meaning the artist has uncovered.
This definition is better understood if one considers the relationship between poetry and beauty in terms of the relationship between two persons who love each other: the love of the one who loves toward the beloved transforms the beloved into another self for the lover, in the sense that the beloved is, for the lover, like his own life, indeed is his very life.[27] Similarly, this occurs between poetry and beauty: beauty is the life of poetry; poetry is the life of beauty. Beauty is the end beyond all ends because it transcends every poetic or productive goal: it stands beyond it, like the horizon in which creative intuition finds expression; beauty expresses this intuition without being its object. It is in this sense that Maritain’s notion of the “end beyond all ends” must be understood.
Beauty thus understood in a finalistic sense does not possess a determinative end; it is “free creativity”[28] that evokes what it evokes without being governed by any particular form. It is art that has an object—the work to be created—which specifies art by bringing this object into existence. In the case of poetry, beauty is a kind of metaphysical participation in Beauty itself.[29] This is the end without specification, beyond every determinative end. Therefore, if creative or poetic intuition tends, in this finalistic sense, toward beauty—that is, toward pulchrum so understood and purely as such—it will express something beautiful precisely because it manifests the characteristics of integrity, consonance, and radiance. Thus, the definition of beauty contained in Creative Intuition ultimately returns to the terms of the essential definition—in the metaphysical sense—already present in Art and Scholasticism, completing and enriching the discourse developed by the author in his earlier work.
The pulchrum as the splendor of form
Speaking specifically of the three constitutive conditions that Saint Thomas attributes to beauty, Maritain asserts that pulchrum is above all splendor or claritas, “because the intellect loves light and intelligibility.”[30] Maritain then grounds the aesthetic discourse on a metaphysical level: “Splendor formae, as Saint Thomas said in his precise metaphysical language: because [...] it is above all the form that is the proper principle of intelligibility, the clarity proper to every thing.”[31] Thus, God, as the highest degree of beauty—that is, Beauty as such—is the most desirable object for the human intellect: nothing else is more fitting to it. “The natural locus of beauty is the intelligible world, and it is from there that it descends.”[32]
What is beautiful is not merely the pleasure experienced in perceiving and knowing certain forms, but rather that which renders these forms the object of a pleasurable apprehension—both sensible and intelligible. Therefore, the beautiful is an element that connects the structure of the intellect, the structure of the known thing, and the foundation of the existence of both.[33]
In Creative Intuition, however, Maritain warns that it would be “a terrible error [...] to forget that being is intelligible in itself, but not necessarily for us, and that it often remains obscure to us, either because its intelligibility in itself is obscured by matter or because it is too high and too pure for our intellect.”[34] According to the French philosopher, therefore, being may be intelligible to us without necessarily being so in itself. The use of the adverb is telling. The splendor formae renders the mystery of being intelligible to us to some extent: a mystery that cannot be fully grasped because it exceeds the capacities of the human intellect, yet at the same time remains intelligible and indeed is so, thanks in part to aesthetic claritas as the splendor of form. Maritain writes: “If we were capable of fully realizing the implications of the Aristotelian concept of form—which does not mean merely outward form but, on the contrary, the inner ontological principle that determines things in their essences and qualities, and by virtue of which they are and exist and act—we would also understand the full meaning of what the scholastic masters intended when they described the radiance or clarity inherent in beauty as splendor formae, the splendor of form, that is, the radiance of the secrets of being that irradiates the intellect.”[35]
If this splendor were not intelligible in some way, it could not radiate into the intellect; however, the fact that it radiates there does not imply that being is fully grasped in its depths by the intellect.
Thus, being remains intelligible in itself, but not necessarily intelligible to us. Maritain is keenly aware of the implications of the Aristotelian concept of form: for the French philosopher, claritas is the aesthetic expression of form understood ontologically, and therefore it is not identical with form outright but is rather its manifestation. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between form as an ontological principle known discursively and the same form shining forth in claritas on the aesthetic plane of visio.
Conclusions
The definition of beauty (pulchrum) according to Maritain is complex. His reflection begins in the 1920s and continues until Creative Intuition, which was written thirty years later. I have demonstrated that Pulchrum as “that which pleases when seen” is complementary to its being the transcendental correlative of poetry, that is beyond every end of poetry. It goes furthermore beyond being the splendor of form. For Maritain, these three definitions complete one another and reveal both the effect of the beautiful and its ontological nature.
The essential definition—that is, the properly metaphysical definition of the beautiful—according to Maritain’s reflection, is composed of its being the “end beyond every end of poetry” and the three essential aspects of integritas, proportio, and claritas indicated by Saint Thomas.
The definition of pulchrum as id quod visum placet is thus only a preliminary definition, a first level of definition. Indeed, Maritain’s approach is not surprising: had he limited himself to a mere commentary on Saint Thomas’s formulation, he would have embraced a noetic monism that does not align with his thought. In particular, in 1953’s Creative Intuition, the author further expands upon the references made in Art and Scholasticism (1920), placing Aquinas in dialogue with his time — as he often does — within the framework of his noetic pluralism. It should not be forgotten that the aesthetic question passes through other intermediate stages, such as Frontiers of Poetry (1935) and Situation of Poetry (1938, coauthored with his wife Raïssa), although these works do not substantially address the issues examined in the present study.
The evaluation of the verb dicuntur might lead one to conclude that this term, referring to beautiful things, is “the product of a sociological inquiry.”[36] Yet the sensuous experience of beauty is possible and real only if beauty exists as perceptible by human faculties and not merely on the basis of a sociological interpretation.[37]
[1] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1980, p. 24. If one wishes to outline Maritain's aesthetics as a whole, one could start from: John Trapani jr., Poetry, Beauty, and Contemplation. The Complete Aesthetics of Jacques Maritain, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2011.
[2] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 120, nota 47.
[3] Cf. For example Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 25; p. 120, nota 54; p. 27 e p. 128, nota 60; p. 31 e p. 131, nota 71; p. 41 e p. 134, nota 84.
[4] Cf. Umberto Eco, Il problema estetico in Tommaso d’Aquino, in Scritti sul pensiero medievale, Milano: Bompiani, 22013, pp. 345-346, nota 44.
[5] Cf. Angela Monachese, Tommaso d’Aquino e la bellezza, Roma: Armando, 2016, pp. 23-24.
[6] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2016, p. 181.
[7] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 120, nota 47.
[8] Cf. Tommaso d’Aquino, La Somma teologica, I, q. 39, a. 8 corp.; Angela Monachese, Tommaso d’Aquino e la bellezza, p. 82.
[9] Virgilio Melchiorre, Arte ed esistenza, Firenze: l’Impronta, 1956, p. 217. – The quotation from Saint Thomas is the continuation of pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent in Thomas Aquinas, La Somma teologica, I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 1. The italics are the author's.
[10] Cf. Roy J. Deferrari, M. Inviolata Barry (edd.), Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1947, p. 303: The verb 'dicor' as the passive of 'dico' should be understood in the sense of 'to name', 'to signify', 'to designate', 'to denote' – The term 'dicuntur' in the sense of sociological passive can be found, for example, in the following passages: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 5um; Ibidem, II-II, q. 81, a. 1 ad 4um; it seems rather to be understood in the sense of pure grammatical passive in: Ibidem, I, q. 79, a. 10 corp.; Ibidem, I-II, q. 59, a. 2 arg. 2; Ibidem, I-II, q. 84, a. 3 arg. 3; Ibidem, I-II, q. 84, a. 3 corp.
[11] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 120, note 47-48; pp. 126-128, nota 57.
[12] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 182 e p. 218.
[13] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Storia dell’estetica, 2: L’estetica medievale, Torino: Einaudi, 1979, p. 280. – Commenting on other matters unrelated to Maritain's thought, Umberto Eco asserts exactly the opposite: 'The phrase 'visa placent' emphasizes the subjective act of enjoyment, which becomes constitutive of the aesthetic experience. (Umberto Eco, Uso e interpretazione dei testi medievali, in Scritti sul pensiero medievale, Milano: Bompiani, 22013, p. 1022).
[14] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Storia dell’estetica, p. 280.
[15] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Storia dell’estetica, p. 282.
[16] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 120, nota 47. – Cf. Mauro Mantovani, Il pulchrum nellʼorizzonte dei trascendentali dellʼessere in S. Tommaso dʼAquino, in Pontificia Accademia Theologica, 4(2005), p. 391: “Possiamo affermare che il concetto tommasiano di bello non indica dunque mai un puro fatto soggettivo, ma sempre qualche cosa di oggettivo”.
[17] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 181.
[18] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 182.
[19] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 191. Circa la bellezza come “fine al di là del fine”, cfr. anche Ibid., pp. 193, 195, 205, 209. According to Maritain, for instance, Charles Baudelaire was aware of this, cfr. Ibid., p. 198. Regarding this Maritainian definition of beauty, cfr. Mauro Grosso, Eco vs Maritain. La definizione del pulchrum tra san Tommaso e arte contemporanea, in Archivio Teologico Torinese XXVII, 1, 2021, pp. 99-111, in particolare alle pp. 104-106.
[20] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 193.
[21] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 194: “Poetry cannot do without beauty, not because it is subjected to beauty as to an object, but because poetry is in love with beauty, and beauty is in love with poetry”. That is to say: beauty is not the formal cause of poetic intuition.
[22] Cf. For example Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 23. – Nora Possenti Ghiglia, Sulla filosofia dell’arte e della poesia di Jacques Maritain, in Studium 3(1972), pp. 189-191 He has brilliantly clarified the issue, with great skill in synthesis and thoroughness, referencing the textual passages in Maritain's various works, from his early writings to those of his maturity.
[23] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 190.
[24] Cf. Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, pp. 194-195.
[25] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 193.
[26] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 191. – Sul bello come causa finale, cf. Ferdinando Fiorentino, Il pulchrum in S. Tommaso», in Sapienza 52(1999), p. 399.
[27] Cfr. Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 193: “Poetic intuition is not directed towards beauty as an end or a specific object; it merely seeks to manifest both the poet's inner self and what resonates within it”.
[28] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 190.
[29] Cf. Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 193, nota 21. – Indeed, Maritain states that 'beauty can only be attained in a mirror' (ibid., p. 193), an expression that aptly reflects the metaphysical concept of participation.
[30] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 25.
[31] Jacques Maritain, Arte e Scolastica, p. 25. – The expression 'splendor formae' does not appear in the works of Saint Thomas.
[32] Cfr. Jacques Maritain, Arte e scolastica, p. 24: "The natural place of beauty is the intelligible world, and it is from here that it descends”. On this plane, God and beauty are mutually implicated in a very particular way. Cf. Angela Monachese, Tommaso d’Aquino e la bellezza, p. 98: 'In the vision of God, known as supreme beauty, consists the happiness of the human being: His perfect and immutable beauty, in fact, is what is most fitting for the intellect, as well as for the appetite related to it.
[33] "The metaphysical framework is always the same, with which Maritain, in the school of Saint Thomas, describes the reality of things, writes: Étienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, New York: Doubleday, 1960; tr. it. Elementi di filosofia cristiana, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1964, p. 227: “"What is beautiful is not the pleasure we experience in learning or grasping certain forms; rather, it is what, in these forms, makes them the object of a pleasant apprehension; and this, naturally, will compel us to seek the beautiful in the very structure of the cognitive power as well as in the structure of the thing known and – I would therefore add – in the structure of Being as foundation. This reflection is one of many testimonies of the theoretical convergence on fundamental metaphysical issues between Gilson and Maritain, beyond some divergent views. In this regard cfr. Mauro Grosso, Alla ricerca della verità. La filosofia cristiana in É. Gilson e J. Maritain, Roma: Città Nuova, 2006, pp. 325-343.
[34] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, pp. 182-183.
[35] Jacques Maritain, L’intuizione creativa nell’arte e nella poesia, p. 182.
[36] Francesca Aran Murphy, Christ the Form of Beauty: a Study in Theology and Literature, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995, p. 209. – The author's conclusions are commendable, even though she adduces textual references that are not appropriate to support her thesis. First of all, she cites the 'Five Ways' of Saint Thomas as passages where the Aquinate would use 'dicuntur' in a sense that is not 'sociological.' However, in this passage of the Summa (I, q. 2, a. 3 corp.), the terms used are: 'intelligunt' (conclusion of the first way), 'nominant' (second), 'dicunt' (third), 'dicimus' (fourth and fifth). It is true that this is the same usage and the same meaning as the case related to 'pulchrum' and not referable to a common-sense or 'sociological' notation, but the term used is not 'dicuntur.' The inappropriate textual references, however, do not undermine the substance of the author's observations, which are indeed corroborated by the other texts of Saint Thomas cited above.
[37] Jesús Villagrasa, Il trascendentale pulchrum in Tommaso d’Aquino, secondo Hans Urs von Balthasar, in Alpha Omega 15(2012), pp. 129ss.
