Antipersonalism and essence

By Luigi Bruno

Luigi Bruno (Italy, 1978) is a teacher of Italian Literature and Language in secondary school. He graduated in Moral Philosophy and is interested in existentialism and the ontological question. He has published papers on Dostoevskij, Sartre, Locke and F. G. Jünger and collaborates with the chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Naples “Federico II”. Email: luigibruno1978@alice.it

Antipersonalism and essence

I define antipersonalism as any vision of man subjected to political, economic, sociocultural, philosophical, religious, or pseudo-religious conditions, such that it reduces or exalts him to an anti-human measure. These conceptions do not consider man for what he is, but associate him with a “super-human” or with a “less-human”, failing to recognize the ontological significance of the personal being that he is. More precisely, if personalism signifies the centrality and irreducibility of the person, antipersonalism is the reduction of this centrality, pushed to the point of denying it. Hence the question we address: where can we find the measure for thinking about man for what he is?

Man is the measure for man

Protagoras said: man is the measure for man. But even then we must first investigate what man is. This is because the question of personalism or antipersonalism is intrinsically linked to the fundamental question: ‘’What is human being?’’ The question has to do with the problem of human nature or his essence. This is not enclosed within an abstract framework, but open to the entire breadth of human existence. I therefore understand existence not as a mere presence actualized once and for all, but as a personal extension in time, a temporalized actualization, that however does not go out with the passing of time. It is existence permeated by existentialist restlessness, although not reducible to it.

Now, from an ontological perspective, the antipersonalistic reduction manifests itself in the delegitimization of personal being. Therefore the concept of person should be understood as ‘’the most perfect subsistent subject’’ with respect to which ‘’the philosophical notions of substance, essence, actuality, potentiality, individual, etc. appear in their full scope’’).[i] An important form of delegitimization of the person is precisely denying or discrediting human nature or essence.

Boethius’ definition of the person

Why connect essence and person? Because the concept of essence is inherent in the very definition of person. According to Boethius, the person is an individual substance of a rational nature: «naturae rationalis individua substantia».[ii] Essence, rational nature, is constitutive of the person. Therefore any discrediting of essence is a disavowal of the person. If we eliminate essence, the individual remains. Deprived of his essential determination he can be annihilated - think of totalitarianism - or succumb to individualism.

The centuries-long debate on essence has highlighted the complex problematic nature of this concept. Critics have deemed it insufficient to guarantee a certain and exhaustive understanding of human being. All those positions that deny the mediation of essence move in this direction; for example, empiricism deems it inadequate to grasp the immediacy of existence. Kant, who adopts the concept of experience of English empiricism, considers that essence, namely, the concept of things, cannot grasp existence.

At times,  essence has been deemed too static with respect to the mobility and multiformity of existence.  Think of the existentialist reaction to modern rationalism, according to which it is possible deduce existence from essence, because the existence is considered a perfection of essence. A rationalist as Blaise Pascal, for instance, recognizes the limits of the esprit de géométrie and refers to the esprit de finesse as regards the mistery of the human being. That means ‘’adfirm the excess of existence with respect to our concepts’’[iii]. At other times, essence has been deemed a determination incompatible with freedom and subjectivity. Or it has been deemed too abstract and, in some ways, not even knowable. In short, it is a legacy of metaphysics that must be freed or somehow reconciled, as existentialism generally does, subjecting it to the ontological primacy of existence, although each position must be considered in isolation.

My proposal

My proposal is to rethink essence in terms of a permanence that is configured as an open and dynamic complexity, endowed with semantic-defining power that establishes the intelligibility of man and things. It arises experientially and is capable of adhering to the movement and unpredictability of existence and subjectivity.

Thinking about essence means arresting the multiplicity of perceptions when thought turns to things as perceived. It is in other words a matter of delimiting an incorruptible and immutable nucleus to guarantee a possible knowledge, an ethical model, a horizon of meaning, a valid platform for political action. This permanence can be thought of in two ways, as Thomas Aquinas suggests in the third chapter of De ente et essentia: it can exist ‘’either in a state of singularity in the real individual (individual nature) or in a state of universality in our mind (universal nature)’’.[iv] That is, it is the same intelligible content, discernible in two different modes of existence.

Mozart is a musician

What is most interesting is that on the one hand, thinking of essence as universality means regressing to a stable core definition. On the other hand thinking of it as individual singularity means opening essence to everything that happens temporally (accidens) and that it can somehow enter into the essential definition as its correlate. For example, one can say that man is musician because Mozart is a musician, even though the notion of musician does not enter into the universal definition of man (animal rationale).

There is therefore not just any accidentality, any existence, or an existence detached from essence, whether ontologically or semantically, but an accidentality specific to man, a truly human existence. This means that essence is not opposed to existence or subjectivity, as if it were a negation of them and a rigidity incapable of keeping pace with them. Quite the opposite! We always remain within the “gaze” of essence.

What is most interesting is that on the one hand, thinking of essence as universality means regressing to a stable defining nucleus. On the other hand, thinking of it as individual singularity means that essence is capable of realizing itself in a concrete and historical existence, that is, it is open to everything that happens temporally. And therefore it is open to everything that can in some way be included in the essential definition as its correlate. For example, one can say that man is musician, although the notion of musician is an accident, that is, it does not fall within the universal definition of man as a ‘’rational animal’’: if Mozart, as a singular man, is a musician, then we can affirm that man, as a universal man, can be a musician.

In other words, there is not just any accident that can be predicated of man (man cannot bark like a dog), but there is an accident proper, specific and relevant to man. Returning to our example, being a musician, which is an accident, is such only in relation to man, to his humanitas that distinguishes him from other beings. In fact, no other being can be called a musician in the proper sense and in the same way as man. That means essence is not opposed to existence or subjectivity, as if it were a negation of them. Rather, it is an openness that always accompanies existence throughout its unfolding.

Thomas Aquinas in De ente

Furthermore, this permanence is not configured as a monolithic and inert block, but as a complexity in turn articulated internally into different degrees/levels/types of intensity: it has a variable ontological and semantic power/capacity. One can speak of essence in the strict sense only of substance, while of what is attributed to it, only in a derivative sense.[v] There is no essence, however, for things that are not a per-itself.[vi] Thus, Thomas Aquinas in De ente clarifies the different ways in which essence is possessed by the different levels of reality (divine substance, simple substances, composite substances, up to accidents, which have a relative essence), and the ways in which essence enters into a relationship with logical intentions (genus, species, difference).

Permanence is also an active and a dynamic principle. A notion of essence emerges as a principle of activity proper to an entity. It is understood as “nature” and is ‘’the immanent principle by which each [thing] is what it is and acts in the way it acts’’, that is, the ‘’natura formaliter spectata’’,.[vii] And again: ‘’things [...] constitute a nature only insofar as they manifest an ordered and therefore unitary principle of existence and action’’.[viii] It should be noted that speaking of essence as a principle of activity does not mean identifying the essence with the faculties that are the immediate principle of action. The faculties, in fact, ‘’are not identified with the essence, but are active powers of the subject’’.[ix] This guarantees the fact that it is always the subject that acts and that every action is accompanied by being and essence. The latter in particular determines the way in which the subject acts.

John Locke and Jean-Paul Sartre

I would like to specify the meaning of my proposal by referring to two philosophical positions that have attempted to delegitimize the thought of essence, namely the empirical nominalism of John Locke and the atheistic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.

Locke moves within empiricism, which then paradoxically transforms into subjectivism, in that substances and essences are ideas internal to the intellect, aroused by sensibility, which is the only source of knowledge. Essences are divided into nominal and real, which in themselves are unknowable. But this distinction is highly problematic and misleading. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke states that essence ‘’is nothing but that abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed: So that every thing contained in that Idea, is essential to that Sort’’. This is ‘’all the Essence of natural Substances’’, which he, however, calls ‘’nominal Essence, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends this nominal Essence, and all the Properties of that Sort’’.[x] This ‘’real constitution’’ is called real essence.

Essentially, Locke splits the concept of essence into two parts separating semantic value from ontological value. The ontological aspect, or ‘’real aspect’’, lies beyond any possibility of human knowledge. The semantic aspect, on the other hand nominalizes it: it becomes a matter of naming, where the name points to what is contained in the essence of a thing. Locke creates a kind of duplication of essence. One version is called the real essence, which is inaccessible to the intellect and cannot be known. The other—the nominal or semantic essence—corresponds to the meaning of the term and the definition of the thing, which aligns with the classical metaphysical notion of essence.

The critical point, it seems to me, is the metaphysical position taken by Locke. I mean the fact that he breaks the necessary link, which is neither identity nor perfect correspondence, between thought and being, and which finds its most radical formulation in fragment number three of Parmenides: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. Moving from here to the devaluation of essence is easy.

Locke’s political purpose

Locke’s gnoseological discourse has a political purpose since it has to do with his principle of tolerance. In the Epistle to the Reader that introduces the Essay, Locke states that in a gathering of friends, unable to find a solution to the problems raised, he deduced that human understanding was limited, and therefore sought to delineate these limits. But the demand for tolerance does not necessarily require a debasement of human capabilities. From this point of view, Locke and Hobbes share the same weakened concept of man: man is incapable of good or adequate knowledge, therefore either submission to an absolute power (Hobbes) or tolerance (Locke) is required. This is precisely what we define as antipersonalism.

Sartre

In Sartre’s case, we must refer to essence as definition. I will immediately point out that I do not understand definition as predetermination, in the manner of Sartre, but as a permanent semantic possibility. It is a possibility that endures, and in this permanence it finds its necessity, because it is tied to the priority of ontological permanence. Therefore, it is configured as necessity, because it is tied to the ontological permanence expressed in it. However, it is a non-necessitating necessity, because that permanence is open and a dynamic complexity. The definition that captures its meaning, that is its truth, does not contradict or limit this same complex, open, and dynamic character. In this way it assumes the problematic nature that derives from this very character.

So, we have said that permanence (essence) is configured as an open and dynamic complexity, structured on multiple levels and degrees of applicability and power/capacity for ontological determination. But permanence is ultimately expressed by definition. Indeed, it is not limited to the ontological significance of determination alone. In arranging itself on the ontological plane of things, it also intercepts its semantic significance: essence signifies, that is it tells us, that this thing is thus and not otherwise.

Permanence (remaining) within the received determination thus also establishes the possibility of knowledge: it flows into the definition, that is, it is connected to thought as a definition that expresses the being and meaning of permanence, and permits its knowledge and recognition, which is the gnoseological plane of knowability.

Thus the necessity of the ontological significance flourishes positively into a meaning. Like a river, it contains within itself the permanence of its flow and the motility of its unfolding. It contains within itself the necessity of permanence as an ontological priority in so far that the meaning intercepts and absorbs within itself. And therefore it valorizes as a possibility that persists throughout the entire flow of existence.

Essence and God

It is precisely the definitional requirement that makes essence-deniers uncomfortable, because it is perceived as binding and unreliable, with respect to the human being’s unavailability to absolute frameworks and pre-established value horizons. This is due to the necessity that definition itself entails in the intuition that can be had of it in relation to an individual substance. Jean-Paul Sartre is a clear example. In him, we find a clear awareness of the relationship between essence and God. Because to think ‘essence’ necessarily means admitting a divine substance that thinks it, and an equally clear rejection of such a reference to God. In essence, Sartre says, if someone created me, he possesses my essence, therefore I am not free.

Sartre thus moves between atheism and the recognition of absolute freedom as the ontological foundation of human beings. On the one hand, he overvalues essence in its defining character, understood as a constraint. On the other hand, in the face of that exorbitant concept of freedom as an ontological principle, he undervalues essence, openly linking its reduction to “zero power” to the postulation of a negative foundation, namely atheism. Hence the famous thesis of the priority of existence over essence.

At a certain point, Sartre reconsiders this relationship: ‘’Existentialism denied the a priori existence of essences; should we not now admit this and recognize that these essences are the a priori characteristics of our passive being?’’.[xi] But even when he reconsiders it, he still admits its negative foundation, and it is by virtue of this that he can think of essence as prior to existence, but only as historical essences. Sartre thus calls all the conditioning that the subject undergoes from the environment in which he is born and formed. Therefore, while essence is stripped of its ontological significance, its defining power is downgraded to a narrative of the past: ‘’essence is everything that human reality grasps of itself as what has been», that is, ‘’the permanent object of our retrospective understanding’’.[xii] From this perspective, Sartre expresses the ontological counterpart of Locke’s gnoseology. For Locke, the intellect functions by adding simple ideas and thus forming complex ideas. For Sartre, existence is the sum of many acts, many initiatives that are then collected posthumously in the biography which, according to him, represents its essence.

Furthermore, Sartre falls into an existentialist indifference that reduces all things, including man, to a single concept of existence that in itself cannot explain or justify anything, not even the individuality that underlies every formulation of freedom. Essence alone guarantees individuality, when conceived as singular, and at the same time, when conceived as universal, guarantees the ethical inviolability of the person.

Finally, just as in Locke, so too in Sartre, once substance and therefore essence are denied, all that remains is a functionalist vision of man. His “essence” is thereby reduced to action: ‘’we want to say that a man is nothing but a series of initiatives, that he is the sum, the organization, the set of relations that constitute these initiatives’’.[xiii] This entails a reduction of man to facticity: you are a man if you act. All of this, too, is anti-personalism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that, in reality, on the one hand, everything we do will always fall within the vast realm of humanitas, that is, in the light of essence: man will always act as man. On the other hand, essence expresses only the essential of what it defines. Everything that refers to this essential is beyond it, but not so much as to arrive at an abandonment. It always remains within the horizon of essence, even without being impeded in the manner of a denial of freedom. Sartre understands freedom, in an ontological sense, as absolute indeterminacy, but it is always the freedom of a specific subject.

Essence allows us to recognize man as man. Deprived of essence, man can become anything, even a serial number tattooed on the wrist, as was done in concentration camps. Furthermore, essence recognizes man as an individual of a species, thus establishing community, that is, man’s sociality and therefore his ethical dimension.

Finally, we must answer the question we began with: where can we find the measure for thinking about humanity as it is? The measure of humanity cannot be humanity itself, because even if we were clear about the principles and essential interrelationships of its nature, there would always remain that underlying mystery, that unattainability that challenges us to ask an unavoidable question of meaning. The answer can only come from reference to that which is somehow other than humanity, from a transcendence. Humanity is determined by a transcendence that must be adequate to the excess that its existence expresses, demands, and seeks. Personalism tells us that this reference is mediated by the concept of person, that is, by the reference to a personal being.

Endnotes

[i] L. Clavell, M. Pérez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome 2014, p. 138

[ii] Boethius, De persona et duabus naturis, chap. III

[iii] AA.VV., Enciclopedia filosofica, Bompiani, Milano 2006, p. 3602

[iv] R. Coggi (ed.), Pagine di filosofia, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1992, p. 65

[v] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z [VIl] 4

[vi] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z [VIl] 5

[vii] AA.VV., Enciclopedia filosofica, Bompiani, Milano 2006, p. 7729

[viii] Ibidem

[ix] L. Clavell, M. Pérez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome 2014, p. 267

[x] J. Locke, Essay, III, 6, 2

[xi] J.-P. Sartre, Critica della ragion dialettica, Saggiatore, Milano 1990, p. 352

[xii] J.-P. Sartre, Essere e nulla, Saggiatore, Milano 2014, p. 71

[xiii] J.-P. Sartre, L’esistenzialismo è un umanismo, Mursia, Milano 2019, p. 83